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Abstract
This research focuses on reactions by members of Congress during the State of
the Union address. Quantitative methods are used to examine if changes in overall
political conditions, especially the level of partisanship, changes the nature of the
responses of political actors. The results find that Congress responds to the speech in two
major ways. Responses can represent attempts at partisan unity or alternatively represent
attempts to show stronger than normal support for certain issues. This research supports
several competing theories of representation and highlights the need to establish proper
context when studying political actions. Since multiple theories of representation can
draw from the conclusions the research also emphasizes the need for models to be
synthesized that draw from more than one theory.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The State of the Union address is a tradition nearly as old as the United States
itself. As such, the speech involves a lot of ceremony and protocol. With the
development of television, the average citizen of the United States has had the
opportunity to observe this tradition. Since 1980, shortly after Congress formed C-SPAN
to televise Congressional proceedings, the speech has always been available for public
record, independently of news media sources which also provide coverage but may
contain bias. The development of television allowed for the average citizen to have a
window into the inner workings of government in a way that had previously been
impossible. Citizens could now see their elected officials directly as they discussed
policy. Beyond pure policy, however, citizens also had a window to see how officials
conducted themselves. Tone, confidence, and any number of other personal factors
radiating from the President might be hard to quantify, but at a human level leave some
form of impact upon viewers. In turn, though members of Congress are technically part
of the audience, their live reactions are also televised. While the speech is about the
President's message, members of Congress have an opportunity to express their opinions
on what is being said, and have the chance for those feelings to be communicated back
home to their constituents. Savvy officials could perhaps use this to their advantage.
Though the State of the Union is of course a very condensed version of policy
debate compared to even the average Congressional floor session, the high profile nature
of the speech introduces an inherent level of importance, leading to increased scrutiny
from all parties. While during President Obama's term viewership has steadily declined
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with each passing year, around 32 million Americans watched his 2015 address (Byers,
2015). Even at a historically low level, 32 million people constitute nearly 10 percent of
the American population. Furthermore, discussion of the State of the Union does not
remain confined to the singular activity of watching the speech live, but also spreads out
through word of mouth conversations and media coverage. Polling data by Gallup shows
that the public responds to the contents of the State of the Union and that citizen opinion
on individual issues can change in strength, context, position, or a combination thereof
after the speech (Newport, Jones, and Saad, 2012). The connection required to create an
impact on a citizens' awareness of politics is clearly established even during years of high
apathy.
Knowing that the State of the Union address affects public consciousness
establishes a causal relationship between the two, which provides for a good starting
point for researchers to ask more detailed questions. What do citizens pay attention to
during the speech? How does the President decide what to include in the speech, and do
the issues included in the speech in turn set the national agenda? Does the tone of the
speech change depending on national mood? What role do the media play in the process?
Many of these questions have at one time or another had scholars attempt to address
them. For example, Jeffrey Cohen addressed the "chicken or the egg" aspect of agenda
setting, trying to answer the question of if the President sets values that the people adopt
or if the President picks issues to put in the speech that the people are already concerned
about (Cohen, 1995, p. 87). However, many of the questions posed have not had solid
answers established. On those questions debate still exists or scholars have not found a
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way to adequately address the issue yet. Other scholars have noted that a true challenge
of studying the State of the Union speeches is the sheer range of scholastic concepts that
can potentially be researched, and the level of depth each question poses (Edwards III
and Wood, 1999, p. 327). The State of the Union is also a rather unconventional topic in
Political Science, so at times may not be getting the research attention the subject
warrants.
For obvious reasons much existing research focuses on the President's relation to
the State of the Union speeches, leaving Congress' connection less studied. With that in
mind, there are obvious focal points to research regarding Congress' role during the
speech. For example, as the President give the address there are natural pauses in
cadence that traditionally allow observers in the room to respond with applause. Within
that framework, members of Congress have the ability to show their support for talking
points, refrain from doing so, or occasionally respond in a more energetic or provocative
manner. An example of this last type of response would be the incident that occurred
during President Obama's 2009 speech when Representative Joe Wilson shouted "You
lie!" towards the podium (CNN, 2009 ). While at first it may appear as if Congress lacks
the ability to put forth a range of responses to the State of the Union, small incidents like
this example show that the situation is more complex. Members of Congress, for various
reasons, can and do put a unique spin on how they react to the President.
The challenge then becomes interpreting what the responses during the speech
mean, and linking responses to other general political science concepts. There are many
general theories relating to Congressional behavior, media behavior, public behavior, and
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a number of other issues that could all possibly come into when interpretive analysis is
conducted. Research regarding Congressional response to the State of the Union requires
all of these areas to be considered. Though foundational work must be done to analyze
State of the Union addresses beyond the speeches' merit as speeches, these other theories
can still provide a wealth of experience for that development.
These questions are undeniably important to the public at large, and have in fact
been asked specifically by media sources in the past. For example, by the early 1990s the
practice of airing the State of the Union on C-SPAN had occurred long enough that the
network's news commentators had observed enough of the speeches to informally
comment on the nature of Congressional responses. In particular, they noted the
differences between members of Congress and the other guests in attendance. Also of
interest to the commentators were the "rules" placed upon each group, regarding what
could and could not be brought into the speech, and what standards each group had for
being considered disruptive (C-SPAN, 1991). Though members of Congress have
incredible latitude in their behavior, they are not completely free from various forms of
pressure outside of political concerns that could curtail their actions. Though only a very
basic analysis, this type of attention shows a clear popular interest in the subject.
The focus of this research will be on gauging Congress' reaction to the State of the
Union and determining what factors primarily influence these reactions. Widely
discussed topics like partisanship may be strongly acknowledged as important, but are
also acknowledged as hard to measure. Research does at least exist to provide a
consistent measure that can ease integration of research concepts, but in some ways these
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decisions regarding how a concept is measures are more important than decisions
regarding which concepts to include in analysis (Lee, 2008a, p. 200). Other research
regarding speechcraft in general will be used to introduce factors that are commonly used
to compare speeches to one another. While this project seeks to incorporate broad
political science concepts, attention must still be given to this traditional angle (Riffkin,
2014). With careful attention given to methodology, an avenue to make State of the
Union research relevant to larger theories is easily obtainable.
Following this overview of the merits of this research, an in depth literature
review will be conducted on the scholarly works in the mentioned and relevant fields. In
particular, theories of representation, media studies, and partisanship will play a large role
in shaping this research going forward. Once the literature is reviewed, a proper
methodology can be constructed that considers existing developments in political science
that can be incorporated into this research while also drawing from that body of work for
guidance when filling in the remaining methodological gaps. Afterwards direct findings
will be presented, first in the form of statistical analysis with ample visual aid and later
interpreted using observations from the speeches. Finally, the research can then be
summarized in a section devoted to explaining how the findings link to other areas of
political science. The conclusions will not exist in a vacuum, and implications for other
research will need to be highlighted.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
Public Opinion
Though the focus of this research is on Congress, some framing is needed first
from a Presidential perspective so that reactions to the State of the Union can be taken in
proper context. Much of the work done regarding Presidential addresses focuses on how
Presidential speeches affect public opinion and approval ratings. The State of the Union
provides a degree of consistency that other speeches lack, making comparisons between
speeches easier. The iconic nature of the State of the Union likely also influences those
interested in public opinion to study it over other potential options. Many studies have
analyzed the relationship, if any, between how important a given issue is to the general
public and how much time a President devotes to that issue in a speech (Cohen, 1995, p.
87). The original work on the subject argued that the President was setting a nationwide
agenda through the choices made in crafting the speech (Cohen, 1995, p. 87). Later
research has argued that the effect is mutual, however. While the President can influence
the public through speeches such as the State of the Union, what the President decides to
include in the address can also be affected by what the public is already concerned about
(Hill, 1998, p. 1328). Though some of this research suggests that Members of Congress
have little, if any, direct control over the issue agenda the State of the Union address
takes, the nature of the connection between audience members and speech givers, or in
Congress's case, active audience members, still needs to be considered (Cohen, 1995, p.
87). Individual members of Congress's actions reflect their constituents' concerns, but
their constituents concerns can also be affected by public displays of support or
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disapproval.
There is also evidence, however, that Members of Congress do have some
flexibility when presenting themselves to the public. Almost by definition, this flexibility
can have different outcomes for how the public sees their elected officials. Officials have
room to temper the language used on a particular issue so that they can maintain a given
position while reaching a compromise with opposing positions, or they can take a more
hardline stance on an issue to potentially gain support at the expense of productivity and
opposing politicians (Druckman and Mitchell, 1995, p. 10). Politicians can have
competing interests and the temptation to sacrifice other concerns for electability can be
strong. The relationship may seem obvious, but by taking it into consideration the overall
picture of both how a member of Congress projects an image and what a member of
Congress has as real, tangible goals can become harder to ascertain.
Representation
To continue a direct consideration of Congress the concept of representation must
be discussed early on. A constant debate exists in scholarly circles that study Congress as
to the relative strengths of ideology versus representative constituent needs when a
member of Congress mentally calculates a course of action. At the very least, however, it
is acknowledged that nearly all political actors subject to elections tailor certain actions to
win favor with their specific constituencies (Erickson and Wright, 2013, p. 91).
Therefore, it can reasonably be expected that members of Congress feel a certain pressure
from the public to act a certain way. Foundational research has even suggested that
nearly all Congressional behavior can be explained as actions calculated to win reelection
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(Mayhew, 1974, p. 11). General public opinion is one factor, but at another level
members of Congress would be expected to specifically respond to the opinion in their
home district or state, which may run counter to overall public opinion, or perhaps even
their own deep seated beliefs (Erickson and Wright, 2013, p. 91). The natural counterargument to a constituent-based view of representation is the previously hinted at
ideology or partisanship view. While these concepts will be discussed later, it is also
important to note that ideology and partisanship can also be channeled through a
constituent-based view as well. If a certain region has a strong majority of voters who
are ideologically rooted in one direction or who are hyper-partisan, that effect might
manifest in a representative simply because the representative wishes to appeal to those
values in voters (Ezrow, Tavits, and Homola, 2014, p. 1559). Other countries where
more than two parties receive significant vote share on a regular basis have provided
evidence for study of this phenomenon, but researchers have also related voter
polarization to changes in control within parties in the American system as well (Ezrow,
Tavits, and Homola, 2014, p. 1559). Other studies have shown that the American public
as a whole is indeed trending towards more partisan, not just elected officials. An
abundance of choice in information sources has a possible effect of allowing individuals
to select more freely information which already fits into their existing worldview, thus
reinforcing opinions and making cooperation more difficult (Reedy, Wells, and Gastil,
2014, p. 1399). To some degree, the nuances are important for understanding
representation, but for the purposes of studying the State of the Union responses
Congress gives it is also important to note that whichever theory holds correct, members
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of Congress do well to reinforce their positions when possible (Fenno, 2003, p. 55).
A traditional survey of representative theory builds from the work of Richard
Fenno. His major contribution to the field is the development of a system of "home
styles" that describe how representatives behave in their home distractions. It is difficult
to adequately summarize everything that homes styles can cover, but the basic end result
that can be applied to other areas of research is that representatives tailor themselves and
their actions to present a positive image to their constituency (Fenno, 2003, p. 31). While
on its face this is an obvious statement, a the less obvious part of the equation but by far
one of the most vital steps is determining exactly what demographics make up a
constituency (Fenno, 2003, p. 8). The entire process for analyzing a member of
Congress's behavior using only this one method understandably becomes very complex
very quickly. However, as demographic analysis is not just a technique studying
Congress, but also a real, concrete strategy that members of Congress want to take
advantage of to gain reelection, the complexity forces them into taking "shortcuts" to
cover as many possible voters as possible, much as academics would like to find easy
proxy factors to study the behavior. Broad sweeping gestures that take little effort but
cast a wide net to catch the attention of potential voters are opportunities that are hard to
resist for elected officials (Fenno, 2003, p. 31). Therefore, while Fenno's focus was on
how representatives behave at home when reaching out to the people of their state or
district, the State of the Union address can still easily fit into this model. The media
provides a conduit through which such effortless but broad action can be viewed from
afar. Furthermore, which such a large audience, as previously mentioned, and the fact

10

that one part of a representative's home style is how they portray events in the capital,
responses during the State of the Union might actually be a more effective tool in
cultivating re-election than most available to the average representative (Parker and
Goodman 2011, 494). This is of course a simplistic view that presents some
complications, such as the fact that it can be difficult to distinguish individual members
of Congress, but other political science concepts can be incorporated to fill in those gaps,
such as the benefit of party unity and party identification.
Partisanship
The strength of partisanship is the natural counter-argument used against
representation-based models of Congress. While there are a technically infinite number
of stances a person can hold, almost all issues come down to a binary vote, necessitating
compromise and the formation of partisan coalitions (Cooper and Brady, 1981, p. 422).
The strength of partisanship has varied over time, but research has shown that partisan
bonds can have some notable effects on political behavior. Partisan concerns can trump
the individual concerns of representatives, but at the same time partisan association can
also generate backlash independent of individual action. This has largely been used as an
explanation for why Congress' overall approval rating is so low, yet there is such a high
rate of incumbents getting reelected (Durr, Gilmore, and Wolbrecht. 1997, p. 175).
Representatives targeted efforts can get themselves reelected, but do not necessarily
generate an overall favorable view of their activities. Since both partisan unity and the
divergent actions required of representation have utility for elected officials, there is a
constant balancing act between these concerns.
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Though partisanship can only be demonstrated to be partially responsible for the
actions of Congress, the grouping of representatives and other political actors simplifies
analysis, so proper application of the concept can help form a broad context that extends
beyond individual members of Congress. In particular, studies of partisanship establish a
few key trends that can be used to predict behavior on a large scale. Currently partisan
unity has been on the rise for several decades, and trend seems to correspond to an
increase in how controversial issues are, both with single issues becoming more
controversial and with more inherently controversial issues being placed upon the agenda
(Lee, 2008a, p. 200). In relation to the State of the Union address, this means that the
nature of the speech as well as the way Congress responds to individual talking points is
likely to change over time.
Partisanship can manifest in ways other than pure party unity and voting cohesion
as well. Due to the structure of Congress, and the American government as a whole, it is
possible for one party to be in control of the Presidency and another party in control of
Congress, or for different houses of Congress to be controlled by different parties. The
potential for these arrangements to cause friction along partisan lines is fairly obvious.
At the same time, study of divided government in this manner at the federal level can
prove difficult because of a lack of institutions that can compare. However, most state
governments are organized structurally in very similar ways to the federal government,
which allows for divided government issues to occur at that level as well. Some studies
on partisanship and divided government have focused here. This research has been
helpful in confirming a trend where the issues covered by a legislature shift to more
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controversial subjects as partisanship and divided government increase (Bowling and
Ferguson, 2001, p. 182). In other words, partisanship itself is not the only factor of
legislative productivity, but partisanship causes an agenda shift which further lowers
productivity (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001, p. 182). This analysis has also made it
possible to filter issue areas into controversial and non-controversial subject areas
(Bowling and Ferguson, 2001, p. 194). Therefore, when studying partisanship with
speeches in particular this research would suggest that an issue by issue view is vital to
understanding the full range of possible response.
Another method that had been traditionally used to analyze the degree of
cooperation in Congress is by analyzing institutional roll call voting. This method
highlights what issues are controversial in a legislative body and considers agenda setting
when examining legislative productivity (Bobic, 2015, p. 26). Some issues simply never
make it to the floor if a bill in question is not predicted to succeed, or if the issue is
predicted to only waste time because it is too controversial. Though when looking at the
State of the Union it does not make much sense to directly incorporate this theory,
examining roll call voting for what issues are raised in Congress is a similar methodology
to considering what issues are raised during the State of the Union. The situations can
form a rough analogy, which validates the other research that suggests issue content
matters during the State of the Union.
During the State of the Union address there is also another possible partisanshiprelated concern. As previously stated, one of the purposes of partisan activity is to create
a rallying effect on a larger group of individuals (Cooper and Brady, 1981, p. 422). This
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process is greatly assisted when signals are sent from a high profile party member, such
as the President. Indeed, studies have shown that popular figures such as the President
often have others attempt to associate themselves to a message to try and gain a small
fragment of the figure's popularity (Lee, 2008b, p. 914). Conversely, someone can also
distance themselves from a certain figure and message too, in an attempt to gain
popularity by contrasting unpopularity. Members of Congress have this popularity aspect
of public opinion to consider in addition to whether or not the President is a member of
the same party as them (Lee, 2008b, p. 914). Members of Congress are known to
comment of the President's popularity, or lack thereof, and explicitly making popularity a
talking point when campaigning or otherwise trying to send a message to their
constituents (Lee, 2008b, p. 914). It is therefore not too great a leap to make to infer that
the responses during the State of the Union are also part of this overall equation.
Direct State of the Union Research and Media Studies
Other research has touched upon the State of the Union directly with content
analysis, though not in a way that directly relates to political concepts. The State of the
Union has been a hotbed for research on how language and political terminology evolve,
which from there can go on to influence other political factors through the languagebased filter (Rule, Cointet, and Bearman, 2015, p. 10837). Researchers have found that
the State of the Union can serve as a focal point for the emergence of different political
environments through the use of consistent new terminology. In broad terms, different
"eras" of political thought can be established through studying the frequencies of certain
words within State of the Union addresses (Rule, Cointet, and Bearman, 2015, p. 10838).
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The implications of these findings mean that, regardless of other work relating to media
studies and popular opinion, a given State of the Union speech is at the very least a
product of the time during which it was given. The character and content of State of the
Union addresses changes over time, but so does political climate. While finding a causal
relationship is perhaps best left to research on public relation vectors, the importance of
establishing context both for overall political conditions and for the State of the Union
cannot be ignored.
Change is an important theme is a good deal of research relating to the State of the
Union, especially media studies. The State of the Union has a long history of over 200
years. This study focuses specifically on the years during which television archives are
readily available, and therefore inherently misses some of the major changes that
occurred in prior years. For example, for the majority of State of the Union speeches
television did not even exist, or, looking back even further, for a certain time period most
of the nation did not even have a reliable method to consume the speech and responses to
it in a timely manner. Even within the television time span, however, there has been
noticeable change in how media sources have been able to cover the State of the Union
and how media sources have chosen to cover the State of the Union. The distinction
between ability to cover and choice to cover is an important one, but the two concepts
intersect when it comes to government regulation. In the past, news agencies had stricter
regulations placed upon them with the goal of ensuring news coverage was "fair"
(Morris, 2007, p. 707). Over time these regulations have become less strict. This has
allowed news organizations to cater to a range of viewpoints rather than remain uniform
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(Morris, 2007, p. 707). Coupled with the increase in news outlets overall, the modern
news media environment is drastically different than the environment during the early
years of televised State of the Union Addresses. This means that theoretical principles
that used to be well researched need to be updated. This change is indeed receiving a lot
of scholarly attention and many of the needed updates are being carefully considered by
scholars (Holmes and Bloxham, 2009, p. 245). Media studies can be complex and with
this wave of research it can be hard to discern which variables are important to political
climate, but above all this trend further reinforces the importance of context when
studying anything through a media lens.
Some media studies have been conducted directly in the context of the State of the
Union in this new environment with increased media options. Typically after the State of
the Union a key party figure from the opposite party of the President will give a counterspeech. This serves as a rebuttal of key points the President made or as an attempt to
control the direction of political discourse. While this practice is not necessarily new, a
gap in research has been noted by some scholars in regards to how well this partisan
message travels and what mechanisms the message can use to spread. The rise of modern
news networks has been identified as one factor that is increasingly giving a larger
audience to this type of message (Conroy-Krutz and Moehler, 2015, p. 575). However,
research also suggests that these audiences are already predisposed towards a certain
message and are seeking it out, rather than the message actually changing the opinions of
viewers (Conroy-Krutz and Moehler, 2015, p. 575). In other words, the State of the
Union rebuttals do more to energize an existing partisan base than they actually do to
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pursued individuals according to this research. From a theoretical perspective this
difference is not insignificant. In a way this research would suggest this sort of media
environment is another symptom of partisanship rather than an aggravating factor.
Therefore, when examining what factors could potentially contribute to content
differences in the State of the Union or to differences in response to the State of the
Union it would be more important to analyze the environment that leads to media
conditions rather than media factors themselves.
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Chapter 3. Methodology
This project attempts to link Congressional responses during the State of the
Union to overall partisanship as well as proxy conditions relating to partisanship using
content analysis and statistical methods. Two data sets and statistical methods will be
used. A complete overview of the data sets and the variables used can be found in
Appendix A. Both methods are considered so that the inherent limitations of one
technique can be can be addressed by the other. The techniques complement each other
for a more complete analysis. The data points will be obtained via direct visual
observation of State of the Union archival footage. As each response occurs a new data
point will be created, numbered and categorized by year, and a yes or no recorded for
both the values of whether or not the response was partisan or disruptive. What these
variables represent will be further explained later on. Furthermore, a note for each data
point will also be made that states which issue policy area the talking point Congress was
responding to belonged to. When issues overlap, the selected policy area will be the one
that received the most emphasis from that talking point.
The goal of the analysis is to form a predictive model of Congress's response
during a year's State of the Union Address. Successful correlation will provide evidence
that members of Congress change how they react during the speech based off changes in
overall political climate. Therefore the first step in conducting this study is to create a
system for categorizing these responses and then watching a range of speeches to record
the content. A "response" for the purposes of this paper is any deliberate sign of reaction
to the speech. In other words, applause for a talking point or laughter at a joke would
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qualify as a response, but someone coughing would not be a response.
The most basic distinction that can be drawn is whether or not a response is
partisan. As previously mentioned, partisanship is a complex concept that can be
measured in different ways, but ideally for coding purposes the distinction should be
made as simple as possible. Therefore, when coding, when one party's response is
different than the other party's response an instance will be denoted as partisan. This
difference could be one party clapping and the other party refraining, or it could be both
parties clapping but only one giving a standing ovation. Though a binary condition,
determining whether a response is partisan or not will still require careful visual
observation to determine the exact nature of the response. Key party figures including
the Vice President, Speaker of the House, and senior Congressional leaders can to a
degree be used to help judge overall party response. Attention to detail is critical, as
sometimes only some members of Congress respond, but not along party lines. The
visual record chosen as a standard for comparison purposes, C-SPAN's archive, regularly
highlights other relevant figures in relation to the President's speaking points because the
cameras are controlled by members of Congress' staff (C-SPAN, 2004). The task is by no
means trivial, but responses can be reliably coded as partisan or non-partisan using these
techniques.
Beyond that variable, it must be acknowledged that not all responses are equal.
At the same time it is difficult to create a measure of the "weight" of each response.
Several options exist, including recording the length of the response or the loudness of
the response. For empirical analysis, though, a variable that can be more easily
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standardized and controlled for other outside factors is preferable. Therefore, responses
will also be coded for whether or not the instance is "disruptive" or not. During the
speech there are natural instances of pause, either due to cadence or as a deliberate move
by the President, which serve as informal cues for when response is acceptable (C-SPAN,
1991). If a response occurs at one of these times and does not disrupt the overall flow of
the speech it is considered to not be disruptive. If, however, the instance of response
interrupts the President, prevents the President from continuing to the speech, or
otherwise occurs outside of the normal and accepted times it will be considered
disruptive. From a theoretical point of view, disruptive responses indicate that the
Members of Congress engaged in that response want to send a very clear message,
putting their priorities ahead of norms encouraging normal responses (Erickson and
Wright, 2013, p. 91).
In addition, the policy area mentioned in the speech that prompted a response will
also be recorded. Sometimes issues intersect, in which case the issue involved for a
response will be recorded as whichever aspect the President was emphasizing most.
These data will allow for comparisons to be made to examine whether certain policy
areas prompt more partisanship than others. As research has been done relating specific
issues to partisanship and finding different trends with different issues, in broad terms
these policy areas will be considered for independent issue-based analysis (Bowling and
Ferguson, 2001, p. 182). When each response is recorded, however, the notation will
seek to be as specific as possible, though, so that analysis can be more detailed if the need
arises and to allow an avenue for future research if a specific sub-issue appears
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anomalous. Recording which issues are being addressed can also assist in establishing
long term trends in the content of the State of the Union, which has been noted to change
over time (Rule, Cointet, and Bearman, 2015, p. 10838).
This project will use the time frame of 1980 to 2014. This range is chosen
because C-SPAN has a reliable archive of footage of every speech starting with 1980, and
because some data collection restraints prevent a full analysis of 2015. C-SPAN's archive
also provides several advantages over other sources, beyond the clear benefit of using
standardized sources. C-SPAN's footage is careful to include multiple camera angles
during the speech, not just a singular view of the President as found in some recordings.
The camera operators routinely switch to views of the entire chamber during periods of
applause, which is vital for observation of Congress' reactions. As previously mentioned,
C-SPAN's footage also often offers a view of key figures observing the speech at
moments when they have a particular relevance to a speaking point the President has just
addressed, zooming in on an area of the audience where there could be noteworthy
reaction, and thus making analysis easier. Unlike news media broadcasts, C-SPAN's
archives do not have distracting overlays containing outside information that could either
obscure reactions from view or possibly even introduce bias during observation. For
these reasons, C-SPAN's archives have been selected as the ideal source.
There are four hypothesis being tested. The first is designed to validate research
on how the media has changed over time, exploring whether or not there has been a
fundamental change in the overall level of response.
H 1 : Responses per time will increase over time.
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To expand with an example, if two speeches were exactly the same length, the one given
in a later year will have more responses. The second hypothesis serves as a control for
human attention span, which could possibly play a role in reducing the level of overall
response.
H 2 : Longer speeches will have fewer responses per unit of time.
The third and fourth hypotheses are the main focus of this study, however, focusing on
the partisan variable and the actual nature of responses.
H 3 : Years with more partisanship will see overall more partisan and more
disruptive responses.
H 4 : Years of divided government provoke less disruptive and partisan responses.
The final hypothesis seeks to validate the idea that a President is acutely aware of
political conditions and will take more care in choosing content during years of divided
government (Cohen, 1995, p. 87). Both OLS regression and logistic regression will be
used to investigate these hypotheses.
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Chapter 4. Analysis
Responses per Time
The first two hypotheses can be answered using a simple linear regression model
with the responses per time as the dependent variable. The chronological year marker
variable and speech length used as the independent variables along with control variables
does not yield very conclusive results. These models are summarized in Table 1. The
control variable measuring the house reelection rate returns significance, though the
magnitude of impact is so small that the effect likely is not even noticeable for practical
purposes. The War on Terror era marker has marginal significance for decreasing
responses per time, while the overall yearly trend has marginal significance for increasing
responses per time, but once again the observed effects are small enough that the overall
change is negligible. Adding in control variables for individual Presidents shows a
drastic change, however. Using President Obama as a base shows most Presidents gave
speeches with a statistically different responses per time rate. The effects are subtle, but
large enough to warrant consideration. Presidents Reagan and Clinton produced slightly
higher responses per time than Obama while George H.W. Bush produced slightly less.
Overall the predictive value of the model has increased, but aside from reelection rates
the other variables of interest from the first model have been pushed well outside
marginal significance. Rerunning the second model using a different President as the
baseline yields no notable new information, only serving to produce a different baseline
for the intercept. With the changes between the two models considered, it can be said
that the individual speaking style a President adopts has a great influence of how
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Congress is willing or able to respond during the State of the Union.
While the regression models show what factors contribute to the rate of responses
per time, it does not necessarily answer all questions about how the rate has changed
from year to year. Observation of how the variable of responses per time trends across
years more directly addresses the base hypotheses. Overall, responses per time has
increased over the longest scale, but has plateaued and remained consistent at different
points on the timeline. Responses per time at the start period of this study were close to
around 0.01 response per second, or one response per 100 seconds in more easily
understood terms. After a few years this metric begins to increase. The transition is not
particularly smooth, with steps made in each direction, before a new consistent level is
established around 0.022 responses per second, or one response every 45 seconds or so.
This change is seen visually in Figure 1.
With all evidence weighed, it is obvious that something has happened to cause
Congress to respond more often during State of the Union addresses. There are now
more responses per unit of time during a speech than there were during speeches past.
The fact that the speeches with more response per time are later than those with less is
very likely not merely because of when the speeches take place. The obvious causes
have not provided sufficient explanation, however. While accounting for Presidential
style is important as the analysis emphasized, within the overall change in responses per
time the arrangement of individual Presidents is largely coincidental. For so many
Presidents to have seen a rise in the responses per time variable likely something else is at
work, something that could have even prompted stylistic changes. It is possible that
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conditions have caused responses per time to increase but that there is some sort of
"optimal level" at which more responses per time is unworkable if the speech is to be
concluded in a timely fashion, or a similar counter concern to the factors leading the
upswing. It may have taken Congress some time to fully process all the influences acting
upon them in this manner, accounting for the unsteady rise and fall of the variable before
it leveled out. This might also account for why the regression analysis found significance
with the House reelection rate, even if it was very slight. Cumulative House experience
could have allowed Congress to be more sensitive how often they responded during
speeches. There are also many general political science theory concerns that might
explain the mixed results the tests of these two hypotheses, which will be discussed once
the entire analysis has been concluded.
Disruptive Responses/Divided Government Part I
Whether or not increased partisanship causes an increase of disruptive or partisan
responses by comparison to responses that are neither can be extensively tested with the
data sets produced in this study's methodology. Analyses can be run testing both
individual responses and each speech as a whole. Information regarding individual
response testing is available in Table 2. Model 1 is a basic analysis designed to avoid
giving too much focus on any one variable. Several variables show predictive value for
disruptive responses, though overall the analysis shows that the chosen variables do not
account for very much of the variance seen. Speech length is significant, but has an
effective coefficient of zero. The analysis shows a slightly tendency for later years to
have more disruptive responses by simple virtue of being later, though the result pushes
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the bounds of statistical significance. Contrary to expectations, the variable for the
reelection rate in the House shows a very slight inclination for more disruptive responses
when more people have been reelected. The War on Terror era shows significance and
speeches during these years see drastically reduced rates of disruptive response. With all
other factors held equal, a response during the War on Terror is roughly only half as likely
to be disruptive as baseline responses. Conversely, the Cold War era has drastically
more disruptive responses, as compared to baseline years in neither of these two eras. A
response during the Cold War is five times as likely to be disruptive as baseline.
Presidential election years also cause a decrease in disruptive responses at a similar level
to the War on Terror variable. Of note, however, is that the partisanship value as
measured by either DW-NOMINATE or divided government do not show significance.
The second model on Table 2 includes control variables for individual Presidents'
terms. The results change dramatically. Speech length no longer registers as significant.
Presidential election years lose significance as well. The influence of the reelection rate
in the House is amplified by an order of magnitude. Presidential approval ratings are
now significant and show a very slight decrease in how likely a response is to be
disruptive as approval goes up. Addressing the point of this second analysis, Presidents
George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush show a significant impact on how disruptive
Congress is when Obama is used as a baseline. Switching baseline Presidencies only
cause negligible changes. This effect can most likely be attributed to speaking style.
Direct observation can support this conclusion. For example, George H.W. Bush did not
pause to create many natural opportunities for Congress to respond in, so naturally the
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rate of disruption would be higher during his speeches regardless of other variables, as
the data indicates (Cohen, 1995, p. 87). While an argument can be made that a
President's speaking style is politically inconsequential because such innate qualities are
likely not politically motivated, the speeches do show highly visible impact from
different speaking styles as seen in this example and therefore speaking styles warrant
inclusion in the overall analysis. As a final note, however, though it is not always the
case in the analyses presented in this paper, the trends within Presidencies for disruptive
responses cause collinearity issues with the Cold War and War on Terror variables. This
does suggest that both arguments about Presidential style hold merit, at least in regards to
the disruptive variable, as the effects so closely align. The final model using Presidential
control variables removes the Cold War and War on terror variables because of these
collinearity concerns.
These questions can also be investigated using the other data set that uses each
year's speech as a data point, rather than individual responses. This approach is more
focused on trends as a whole, but is susceptible to problems caused by having a small
number of data points. Mirroring the first analysis using the individual response data set,
a standard regression does not find significance for any variable used. However, adding
control variables for individual Presidents brings some factors to significance. This
information is summarized in Table 3. With President Obama as a baseline, George W.
Bush's term as President shows statistical difference in terms of disruption. Those eight
years saw a significantly lower rate of disruption. The reelection rate for House members
and Presidential approval also show significance in a similar manner to the individual
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response analysis. The higher the House reelection rate the more responses are
disruptive, with the opposite occurring for Presidential approval. Both factors have only
a small impact, but the Presidential approval impact is particularly small.
While one previous discussion point was how the speaking style of some
Presidents alone may be a strong enough factor to cause a difference in rates of disruptive
responses, the fact that the model produced in this analysis has a comparatively large R
Square value with relatively few significant variables may suggest that several other
outside factors not measured by this data set are included within the variable that denotes
George W. Bush's terms. Political conditions during those terms may simply have broken
the overall trends other variables measure for a brief amount of time that is significant, or
other variables were at play at those times and measured variables serve as intermediate
variables. There are some obvious potential causes, though one could argue that the War
on Terror variable was designed as a "catch-all" in that regard. However, it is also
important to note that while the War on Terror has a certain stylistic tone in politics, the
popularity of the War on Terror and how the concept has been handled has changed over
the time span. Therefore, while as coded the War on Terror control variable has merit, the
pressures involved in producing these results might have been better measured by
differentiating between the early War on Terror and a later time period. As a final note of
importance for the divided government hypothesis, once again that variable did not show
significance.
Partisan Responses/Divided Government Part II
For testing partisan responses the analyses can simply swap the dependent
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disruptive variables for dependent partisan variables. Table 4 shows these results, with
Model 2 once again differing from Model 1 due to the inclusion of additional control
variables that consider individual Presidents. Though the Pseudo R Square is low,
explaining around 5% of the dependent variable, a basic analysis of the individual
partisan responses produces many significant variables. Presidential election years,
divided government, overall partisanship, Presidential approval, and the Cold War era all
have significance with a notable impact. Speech length is also significant but once again
has a coefficient of zero. Presidential election years show a moderate increase in partisan
responses. Divided government shows a decrease in partisan responses at a level that
roughly cancels out the effect of Presidential election years. Higher Presidential approval
decreases partisan responses just enough to be noticeable, while the Cold War increases
partisan responses by around a factor of five. By far the variable with the most impact is
partisanship as measured by DW-NOMINATE. Partisanship's coefficient is 26,340.176,
but it is important to keep in mind that due to the nature of the derived variable, the
difference in partisanship as measured between Congressional terms is typically around
0.03, so while the impact is still massive the effective change in value between years is
only around 800. Of course a year also starts at a rather high value, so each year's
additional gain is also tempered in that way. As predicted by the fourth hypothesis,
divided government has the expected effect of decreasing partisan responses.
The finding relating to partisanship may seem like an obvious finding, but the key
is that political differences are translating directly into observable differences in behavior.
The relationships between politicians are complex, and even though disagreements are
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inevitable it does not necessarily mean members of opposite parties are naturally
adversarial in other regards. These statistics show that in this case, however, political
differences do translate to open response, and that the State of the Union is seen as an
appropriate outlet for partisan sentiment. Through a combination of variables, though, it
also appears as if over time partisan expression during the State of the Union has
decreased. The year variable has marginal significance indicating a general downward
trend despite the trend of increasing partisanship.
Adding in control variables for individual Presidents has the same methodological
problem here as with the previous analysis involving individual responses and disruption.
Using President Carter as a baseline only Presidential approval retains significance. The
Cold War control variable and Presidential election year variable are now rated as
marginally significant. Once again changing baseline Presidents affects very little overall
statistically.
These results may imply that each President does not necessarily cause anomalies
in the overall predictive trends, but that within each President's speeches there are
different individual trends. Phrased differently, under each President there are still certain
"rules" that can be used to predict whether a response will be partisan or not, but the rules
are also significantly different depending on the President in office. Speeches under
different Presidents do not necessarily break overall trends, but each President has a
micro-trend within their own set of speeches. If this is correct, Presidential approval is a
contributing factor within those micro-trends. While this idea raises the complexity of an
accurate model by a substantial degree, observational evidence can be found more easily
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that would suggest Presidents do change stylistically over there terms. As one example,
George H.W. Bush slowed his style and allowed Congress more chances to respond as he
progressed as President. Though relating to disruption, it is not too hard to imagine
Presidents making other changes that affect partisanship. As a second example, Bill
Clinton in later years took to referring to the budget as "my balanced budget," which is a
slightly politically loaded term, and could have perhaps had some partisan influence.
This question can also be investigated using the combined yearly data as well.
This analysis has two models on Table 5, showing linear regression without Presidential
control variables at first and then with those controls added for the second model. This
additional analysis shows that only Presidential approval, Presidential election years, and
the Cold War era have significance, in roughly the same magnitude and direction as the
analysis on individual responses. Responses per time shows a possible large impact,
where more responses per time lowers partisan responses, but hangs at the very edge of
marginal significance. Overall partisanship and divided government have only slightly
more favorable significance values and have direction and magnitude in line with the
individual response analysis. These variables have a potential large impact so they are
important to consider even if the evidence is not completely statistically significant. The
R-square value is reasonable, however, showing the model has an explanatory value for
the dependent variable around 36%. Unlike previous analysis, adding control variables
for individual Presidents both lowers the R-Square value and reduces the significance of
all variables. Presidential approval and responses per time remain the most significant
variables and do not fully clear the margins.
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One possible explanation for these results is that the year by year data set does not
have enough points of information to firmly establish a trend. A given year can deviate
significantly from an overall trend for a variety of reasons not measured in this study or
for reasons that are completely unique to a given point in time. Such events are difficult
to control for. The easiest solution is to expand the data set, but unfortunately that can
only occur as more State of the Union speeches are produced, compromising on the
standard of the source material used, or shifting the focus from televised speeches and all
the connections those speeches imply.
Combining Partisanship and Disruption
Both partisan and disruptive responses indicate something important about the
goals and behavior of Members of Congress. Making special note of responses which are
both partisan and disruptive at the same time can therefore be used to analyze instances
during which Congress' reaction was particularly strong. Model 1 on Table 6 shows a
basic test of this idea and Model 2 shows the inclusion of the individual President control
variables. Basic analysis of the individual responses finds significance for both the Cold
War era and the War on Terror era, as well as divided government and Presidential
approval. The non-era variables both show a reduction in responses that are both partisan
and disruptive. For Presidential approval this is in line with the previous findings,
showing only a slight decrease. For the divided government variable this is perhaps the
best confirmation of the hypothesis that divided government leads to a stylistic change
that makes the content of speeches less controversial during those years. A lack of
divided government make a disruptive partisan response more than twice as likely to
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occur than in years of divided government. Even if divided government does not change
the standard scheme of how Congress responds to a speech, this can perhaps be evidence
that divided government can lower the strength of reactions.
Adding controls for individual Presidents reduces leaves Presidential approval as
the only significant variable. Logically it is not a stretch to imagine that this factor would
be stronger than the other three variables found significant without these controls, as
Presidential approval likely is an input into other variables even if they are not directly
the same. When reactions that are defined complexly by having both a disruptive and
partisan quality are considered, the inclusion of Presidential styles may be enough to
disrupt the trend without establishing their own trends. Conditions may be required in a
narrower range than for the responses that are only disruptive or only partisan, and many
factors related to style can disrupt those conditions. With the difficulties involved in
establishing a trend in the large data set, work involving the yearly data points does not
produce any usable results.
Issue-based Analyses
As noted by previous research, one effect of increased partisanship is a change in
issue frequency (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001, p. 182). From basic observation it is clear
that in recent years the State of the Union has shown a noticeably different issue
organization than in earlier years. The types of issues addressed have changed. To a
degree, that change may be simply caused by different issues gaining or losing salience,
an explanation which would work well in relation to the end of the Cold War and start of
the War on Terror. However, in addition to the fact that some issues cannot be explained
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this way, such as tax issues or economic issues, the fundamental structure of the speeches
have changed as well. In early speeches, an issue would be interspersed throughout the
speech, brought up multiple times with very few chances to respond on that single issues
presented consecutively, but in later speeches issues tended to be discussed all at once
before moving on to the next. This could potentially affect how Members of Congress
respond. The question is perhaps better suited to a review by a psychological
professional, but it is not hard to imagine that perhaps the audience grows tired of
responding to a given issues after a while if the President spends a significant
uninterrupted amount of time on it without diverting to other topics. This of course
would then alter the statistics collected by this study.
The data collected in this project can be used to test the validity of some of these
concerns, lending extra support to the other findings. The percentage each issue makes
up a speech can be seen to change on every issue. In fact, there many instances where
issues will not be mentioned at all in a speech. Due to the size of the data set it is
impractical to exhaustively detail every nuance in issue change over time, but a few
examples serve to highlight how issue salience can effect Congressional response. This
approach is also necessary because no clear trend emerges in issue salience over time,
both because of the reoccurring problem of few data points and also because the issueattention cycle is not necessarily very long (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001, p. 184). Five
issue areas in particular can be used to demonstrate issue disparity. Foreign Affairs
stands out because in 1980 nearly half of Congress's responses were in relation to that
policy area. Foreign affairs rarely gets that much attention. Due to rhetorical styles,
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some years even appear to have no references to foreign affairs. This is not to say the
subject was not discussed, only that the President gave a speech which reflected foreign
affairs as relating primarily to another issue area. A good example would be how more
often than not issues relating to terrorism were phrased in a way that related more to
maintaining a strong military than in terms relating to other countries. Economic growth
is another issue that was prone to this effect. Many programs can be described as "job
creators" or as helping the economy, rather than described in terms of what the program
does directly. Where the President puts focus can drastically alter how much of a speech
is dedicated to economic issues. For example, President Obama discussed the Affordable
Care Act at great length, but often discussed the Act in economic terms, not health care
terms. Conversely, President George W. Bush nearly always put the focus of Medicare
Part D on the health benefit gained by having access to prescription drugs, not on the
economic savings aspect of the plan. Energy, crime, and health care are also issues areas
that stand out because they do show a clear salience change over time. For health care
there are some overlapping issues with Presidential focus as well that play into the
changing numbers. These five issues are summarized in Table 7.
The next step is then to establish that not all issues prompt the same types of
responses from Members of Congress, which this data set is also well positioned to
answer. Crime received a disruptive response around 37% of the time that the issue
received a response. By comparison, foreign affairs responses were only disruptive
around 19% of the time. Energy responses were disruptive around 22% of the time,
health care responses around 25%, and direct economic issue responses around 33%.
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This information is provided in Table 8. Of these issues, health care was the most
partisan, receiving partisan responses 30% of the time. Foreign affairs was the least
partisan, with around 12% of responses being partisan. Direct economic issues were
partisan around 20% of the time, energy responses around 22%, and crime responses
around 23%. This information is provided in Table 9. The exact numbers are not what is
important. The fact that the numbers show notable differences is. All factors being even,
what the President chooses to speak about could significantly affect the numbers of
partisan or disruptive responses.
As established by previous research and theoretical links, however, it is also
important to note that the content included in a speech is also dependent on other political
conditions that have also been used in this project to predict levels of disruptive and
partisan responses (Cohen 1995, 87). Content therefore can be considered more of a
symptom that can help understand the complete picture of how political actors respond to
these speeches rather than an independent cause. Content is still worth considering
directly because of the statistical effect that can be observed, but the content is not
created in a political vacuum.
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Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion
Without proper context the findings presented in the previous chapter can be hard
to interpret. The four hypotheses presented earlier serve to focus the analyses in a
productive manner, however. The first hypothesis, that responses per time will increase
over time, can tentatively be said to be true if absolute terms are not used. The three most
recent Presidents have given longer speeches and speeches with more responses per unit
of time than the earlier Presidents studied. In later years, however, a sort of plateau has
been reached in these figures and in absolute numeric terms some later years show a
decline. The most obvious possible cause is the changing nature of the media
environment in which these speeches are presented (Holmes and Bloxham, 2009, p. 245).
Unfortunately, the design of this study focused on connecting many broader concepts to
the reactions to the State of the Union, so a study more focused on directly measuring
media related issues would be needed to draw a more definitive connection. This
project's scope could only focus on so many concepts and remain coherent, however, and
thus relied on theoretical links between proposed effects of shifting media conditions and
the variables used here. The variables chosen were used because of their closeness to
actual political processes. If these variables do not explain the observed changed,
perhaps an approach that more directly measures the change in media conditions would
have found a link. Research dedicated to media studies has at least one proposed method
for doing so, measuring the spread major 24-hour news networks with comparisons to
Congressional behavior (Clinton and Enamorado, 2014, p. 928). The statistics presented
here do provide evidence that some form of change has taken place, though, even if the
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specific cause has not been measured.
Furthermore, the fact that the relevant values peaked during Bill Clinton's years in
office and then move back and forth over a relatively stable level show that perhaps once
responses per time reach a certain threshold only diminishing returns are produced by
additional Congressional responses. More responses logically slow down a speech, and
while the opportunities presented are valuable, after a certain point those concerns have
to be balanced with the need to bring the speech to a conclusion in a timely manner.
Speech length seems to have found a stable equilibrium at around one hour, and Congress
can maintain a response rate of one response every 45 to 50 seconds. There is no rule
that enforces these limits, only the economic considerations of human behavior.
These factors also come into play regarding Presidential style. In particular, some
of the nuances of speechcraft may play a larger role that theoretically accounted for in the
model. Speechcraft includes a lot of subtle nuance that can be hard to quantify. This
difficulty is further compounded by differences in Presidential personality (Renshon,
1994, p. 375). There has been a good deal of discussion in the academic community
about the merits of different theories in this regard (Mazlish, 1994, p. 745). At the very
least, however, content analysis of this range of speeches makes it abundantly obvious to
observers that there is some quantity that makes addresses by different Presidents
qualitatively different from others.
The findings relating to disruptive and partisan responses by Congress provide the
most important insights of this research. There are many models and theories that
describe how representatives behave in the American system of government. Most make
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it abundantly clear that representatives are compelled to act in a way that helps secure

reelection and effectively communicates a message tailored to that end to their
constituents (Druckman and Mitchell, 1995, p. 10). It is no surprise that partisanship has
value in this equation as well, because though partisanship is mostly about unity on a
broad slate of issues it can also help with reelection in an overall partisan climate.
(Reedy, Wells, and Gastil, 2014, p. 1399). The findings presented here, however, show
that reactions by Congress during the State of the Union are seen as valuable enough to
work into the equation as well. If Congress did not take the institution seriously then
each year would see a very similar and generic response. The analyses on partisanship
and disruption show that Members of Congress act differently depending on the differing
political conditions of a given year. Both overall trends such as the increasingly
polarized political atmosphere and more temporally local events such as Presidential
election years have some connection to the process, showing that not only is Congress'
behavior changed by overall political conditions but that the process is also highly
sensitive to change.
The noted effect of individual Presidents on the process also reinforces this
finding. Though Presidents are constrained by the same political factors that are being
measured and compared to Congressional response, there is a fundamental difference
between speaking styles that can hard to measure but nonetheless has an effect on how
Congress responds. Presidents can be more or less accommodating to Congress by
pausing for longer or shorter amounts of time at critical moments in the speech.
Furthermore, as has been extensively considered by previous studies, the President
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critically has control of the agenda and tone of the speech, which sometimes can deviate
from the average political salience nationwide (Cohen, 1995, p. 87). At a very basic
level, at least, the President is also aware of Congress' motivations and can at times make
decisions based off this knowledge or use those motivations for their own benefit. An
example of this would be Bill Clinton's insistence in his later years to referring to the
budget as "my balanced budget", which inherently colored Congress' options for
response by the terminology chosen. The President has the ability to take any one issue
and discuss it in multiple ways (Cohen, 1995, p. 87). This freedom can change how
favorable an issue both for the viewing public and for Members of Congress who must
quickly mentally calculate their own response.
This is a skill that a shrewd President can make great use of, but it does not
entirely overpower the overall political climate. It is also a skill that observers have
noted that Presidents put effort into developing, so at the very least those in the office
believe style can be valuable (Barlow, 2009, p. 20). There are also noted tools, such as
the teleprompter, that can effect how a President gives a speech, while also magnifying
the inherent choices a President makes about their own style (Barlow, 2009, p. 21).
While these considerations heighten the complexity of any model, if these concerns are
actively something political actors themselves seek to understand then there is definitely
also academic merit in their study.
Addressing the frequent issue that occurred with collinearity of the Cold War
variable and some Presidents, it is possible that this effect happens because there are three
different Presidents in the studied time frame of the Cold War that do form an overall

40
pattern while the two studied Presidents in the War on Terror era happen to be
anomalously different. This possibility also warrants the repeated discussion that
different control variables for the early and later War on Terror to account for some
possible differences in overall political conditions as the popularity of the War on Terror
faded (Heatherington and Suhay, 2011, p. 546). Another possibility is that Obama is
statistically different for other, unrelated reasons that were not measured, but because
there are only two Presidents recorded during the War on Terror the variable is still
rendered problematic.
The variable deserves further analysis, and perhaps a satisfactory answer can only
be gained with the passage of more time and more Presidents so that Obama can be
studied in full context. Another alternative approach may be to measure the "magnitude"
of the era variables rather than the mere presence of the Cold War or War on Terror. For
example, War on Terror casualty figures could be one metric of the War on Terror
progressing as a political factor. However, a combination of two or more variables can
also be said to potentially represent changing magnitudes in era variables. For example,
the popularity of the War on Terror likely had some form of impact on the Presidential
approval variable, or perhaps even the Congressional reelection variables. When taken
together the overall effect may be the same as any other technique that measures era
magnitude. However, even though this might theoretically cover that gap in
methodology, actually creating the magnitude variables that directly measure the effect is
of course preferable to combining the others in such a manner without solid confirmation
that they do indeed interact in that manner.
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To directly address the questions posed by the hypothesis that increased
partisanship would increase disruptive and partisan responses it is important to draw a
distinction as to why both of these metrics are important, yet different. Partisan
responses show that partisan unity has an effect on behavior during the State of the
Union. The affirmation provided by this research in that regard most importantly
indicates that partisanship is a crucial factor that affects Congressional behavior during
these events. The conclusion may seem obvious that an increase in partisanship will lead
to an increase in partisan responses, but the finding has more to do with determining how
far partisan influence has spread. Partisan concerns are just one of many things that
affect how members of Congress act (Durr, Gilmore, and Wolbrecht, 1997, p. 175).
Theoretically partisanship could touch nearly everything a Member of Congress did, yet
at the same time there are some activities where partisanship likely does not have a great
influence. As a frivolous example that serves as provide the most extreme end of partisan
considerations, it is highly unlikely that the Congress will ever split their private gym into
separate sections for Democrats and Republicans, no matter how intense partisanship
gets. More seriously, there are a range of considerations besides partisanship that can
counteract partisan behavior, the the responses during the State of the Union could have
potentially been overshadowed by those concerns (Fenno, 2003, p. 55). Most notably,
Members of Congress must be concerned with constituents in their home district or state
which may not be fully aligned with partisan concerns (Fenno, 2003, p. 55). Without
focusing on specific individuals within Congress it is hard to directly measure these
counter concerns. The strong overall impact of partisanship, however, shows that party
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influence does hold a large degree of sway over Congress despite possible counters.
By contrast, disruptive responses are more related to how important an issue is to
Congress. While partisan tensions can fuel some Members of Congress to react in a more
disruptive manner, there are many other reasons why a response might be disruptive. For
example, there are some issues that politically everyone mostly agrees on and it would
not help a politician's popularity to go against. This effect is both seen in the results and
predicted by previous research (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001, p. 182). Support for the
military is a good example of an issue of this nature. Members of Congress appear eager
to always show support for the military, and thus might engage the issue with reactions
that are stronger than the typical issue raised during the speech. As another example,
whenever the President invites special guests to the State of the Union those individuals
have frequently done something that everyone feels should be celebrated. Issues like
these cross party lines, and thus in a way it is not surprising that partisanship was not a
big influence on disruptive responses. The fact that Presidential election years, when the
public is more politically engaged, show more attempts by Congress to assert that issues
are important to them too makes logical sense as a way to garner at least a little bit of
support through issues that are popular at the time (Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith, 2009, p.
98). This also ties in with the other factor that was commonly significant, that more
disruption occurs as a President's popularly goes down. The President likely does not
want to linger on issues causing low Presidential approval, but Congress may want to
differentiate themselves from the President's stance, thus requiring a bit of disruption to
ensure the message gets heard. The differences in findings between partisan responses
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and disruptive responses serves to highlight the nuance of Congress' responses.
The focus on divided government yielded results that are consistent with the
knowledge gained from the partisan and disruptive response analyses. Members of
Congress wish to express their opinion regardless of party control of different branches of
government. With that in mind it makes a degree of sense that divided government
would not strongly impact how disruptive responses were overall. Relating to how issue
content changes, however, divided government shows a level of control by the President
that steers the overall speech towards less controversial issues, and thus less partisan
responses occur (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001, p. 183). This effect says more about the
nature of divided government than it necessarily relates directly how the opinions of
Congress. The fact that content changes how Congress reacts, though, is an important
and relevant concern. While it may seem that some factors have an overwhelming
strength compared to others, in a way this discovery can be seen as a reminder that
certain rules only exist for certain premises, and that the premise of a speech can be
changed at a fundamental level, thus changing the rules.
The findings presented in this paper greatly clarify the nature of Congressional
behavior during the State of the Union. The differing factors that influence partisan and
disruptive responses highlight that the responses Congress give during the speeches are
not necessarily intuitively the same. There are competing theories that would each make
different claims as to what factors would overpower others. Though partisanship-based
theories are often at odds with constituent-based theories, there is general agreement that
all activity is done for the purpose of getting reelected (Parker and Goodman, 2011, p.
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494). The fact that Congress responds for different reasons therefore likely indicates that
the range of factors that are considered to impact reelection is large and spans both major
theories, not that elected officials are acting counter to this widely accepted notion. The
results serve as a strong warning not to make too many assumptions regarding the nature
of political behavior and that complex systems cannot be always be distilled to a more
basic level.
Some of the findings may seem obvious, but the confirmation and balancing of
factors is still and important step for political science. Though at first measuring
partisanship in Congress against the partisan nature of responses may seem like a clear
cut case of collinearity, but as previously discussed the analysis is more important for the
knowledge of where to draw the line of partisan effects, and how much other factors
temper the effect of partisanship (Durr, Gilmore, and Wolbrecht, 1997, p. 175). The other
findings relating to disruptive responses and divided government should, in a way, act as
a foil for any argument saying the connection needs no study because of obvious
linkages. The fact that disruptive responses are not closely linked to partisanship means
that other representational models find an area of relevance using an approach that was
specifically measuring common counter-arguments against those models. The fact that
both models can find some support reinforces the idea that compromise and balance
between the major behavioral theories likely holds more explanatory power than
completely focusing on partisanship or on home district concerns. The analyses chosen
by this study did not directly investigate which alternative might be the most viable, but
the secondary analysis on the difference in disruption and partisanship between issues
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might present some clues for future research. In addition, as disruptive responses have
been postulated to be attempts by Congress to make sure support of an issue is visible,
including research on issue salience is likely prudent (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001, p.
184).
Furthermore, it could have easily been postulated that divided government would
have seen a more partisan and disruptive Congress as rivalries intensified. Instead the
opposite was true. While the evidence this project has presented relating to issue-shifts is
not as conclusive as the other aspects of the analysis, it does provide a viable explanation
that agrees with several major theories. Political conditions have been shown to change
the content of legislative activity (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001, p. 184). Speeches
specifically have been studied as well, finding that speech content can be highly variable
(Cohen, 1995, p. 87). Overall, the results stand on their own by providing critical nuance
on Congressional behavior and partisanship, while also productively supporting other
ongoing research. The importance of questions previously asked but not conclusively
answered is highlighted as the multiple theories are drawn together.
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures
Table 1

OLS Regression
Dependent Variable Responses Per Time
Model 1Sig=0.000, Model R-Square = 0.601
Model 2 Sig= 0.001, Model R-Square = 0.614
Model2

Model 1
B

Sig.

B

Sig.

Year

0.001

0.096

0.001

0.432

House Reelection

0.000

0.042*

0.001

0.057

Senate Reelection

0.000

0.847

0.000

0.058

War on Terror

-0.008

0.059

-0.008

0.138

Cold War

-0.006

0.222

(a)

(a)

Speech Length

0.000

0.185

0.000

0.239

Divided
Government

0.001

0.648

-0.015

0.710

Partisanship

-0.029

0.486

0.027

0.957

Presidential
Approval

0.000

0.903

0.000

0.775

Presidential
Election

0.001

0.493

0.000

0.810

Midterm Election

0.000

0.897

0.000

0.971

Carter

-0.032

0.059

Reagan

-0.033

0.042*

GeorgeH.W.
Bush

0.030

0.045*

Clinton

-0.017

0.049*

George W. Bush

-0.007

0.205

(a) - No output due to colinearity issues.

--
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Table 2
Logistic Regression
Dependent Variable Disruptive Responses
Model l Sig= 0.001, Pseudo R-Square = 0.079
Model 2 Sig= 0.000, Pseudo R-Square = 0.098
Model l
--

---

-----

----

-- ---------------------r--------

Exp(B)
--------------

-------------------

----

---- -

~--=-i\i~d~-2-=-r-~-=

Sig.
-----

1.000

r

Exp(B)

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-

-

-- ---

----

--

----- -

Sig.
-----

-

--

---

0.000*

1.000

0.853

I::::~::::~::
~:~:~
-.
.
.
~~j;
-w;
- --

0.903

0.189

1.131

0.000*

1.002

0.837

Speech Length

~~ T~;;~r

I

I - -- -- -

---0.508____ ---- --0~032*__ _

------ - ---------- ----

------- ----- - -- ------- ------- -----

Cold War

5.306

0.000*

Presidential
Election

0.611

0.000*

Midterm Election

0.861

,1

-- -

--- ---------------------------------------

0.811

0.247
------

----- ---- --

0.164

0.912

-- ---------------

--

----

-------

----

0.508
------

----

Divided
Government

0.777

0.173

0.949

0.801

Partisanship

0.042

0.360

6.866

0.689

Presidential
Approval

0.993

0.144

0.980

0.000*

1.000

0.853

Reagan

0.903

0.189

GeorgeH.W.
Bush

1.131

0.000*

Clinton

0.811

Carter
--

(}e-o~g;W. B~~ll

1

---

---

-

- - - -------- --------

________ ~.98o

0.164
-

----

I __

-~-9~0*_
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Table 3
OLS Regression
Dependent Variable Disruptive Response Percent
Model Sig= 0.033, Model R-Square = 0.410
-

---

--

--~-------------

B
-

--

--

----

----

--

----

- - ------------------------------

Sig.

-----

---------------- - - - - - - -

Speech Length

-0.001

0. 879

Year

-3.606

0.281

House Reelection

2.609

0.000*

Senate Reelection

-0.113

0.724

Presidential Approval

-0.478

0.060*

Presidential Election

-1.768

0.792

Midterm Election

0.257

0.967

Divided Government

2.740
-----

-------

-

Partisanship
-

- -

-- - -

--

0.789
---

61.869
-------------

-

-

------

0.768

-

------

Cold War

(a)

(a)

War on Terror

14.864

0.399

Carter

-70.376
--

--- -----

0.237
--- ---------1--

Reagan

-51.493

0.359

George H.W. Bush

-21.589

0.678

Clinton

-26.051

0.370

George W Bush

-42.894

0.000*

(a) - No output due to colinearity issues.

--

--

50
Table 4

Logistic Regression
Dependent Variable Partisan Responses
Model 1 Sig =0.000, Pseudo R-Square =0.047
- ;quare = 0 051
M ode12 s·1g = 0 000 P seudo RS
'
Model 1

Model2

Exp(B)

Sig.

Exp(B)

Sig.

Speech Length

1.000

0.043*

1.000

0.589

Year

0.901

0.084

0.919

0.349

Presidential
Election

1.375

0.024*

1.316

0.091

Midterm Election

1.299

0.092

1.209

0.262

House Reelection

1.007

0.650

1.031

0.313

Senate Reelection

0.999

0.907

1.003

0.817

Divided
Government

0.600

0.016*

0.673

0.206

Partisanship

26,340.716

0.013*

7,197.599

0.118

Presidential
Approval

0.970

0.000*

0.967

0.000*

Cold War

5.385

0.000*

7.070

0.065

War on Terror

0.627

0.231

0.965

0.946

Carter

(a)

(a)

Reagan

0.485

0.242

GeorgeH.W.
Bush

0.497

0.301

Clinton

1.503

0.608

George W Bush

0.479

0.186

·-

-~

(a) - No output due to colinearity issues.

--
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Table 5
OLS Regression
Dependent Variable Partisan Response Percent
Model 1 Sig= 0.026, Model R-Square = 0.359
Model 2 Sig= 0.096, Model R-Square = 0.300

I - -- - -- -- --- -- --- Model 1

Model2

B

Sig.
--

-

-------

I

B

Sig.

----------------------

---

-------------

Divided
Government

-8.471

0.058

-5.411

0.429

Partisanship

158.663

0.072

100.376

0.447

Cold War

26.695

0.011 *

(a)

(a)

-7.088

0.376

0.683

0.950

War on Terror

--

------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Responses Per
Time

-50.895

0.095

-60.943

0.090

Presi den ti al
Approval

-0.255

0.047*

-0.287

0.070

Presidential
Election

7.164

0.036*

5.940

0.168

Midterm
Elections

3.139

0.366

1.616

0.681

House Reelection

0.133

0.714

0.592

0.428

0.205

-0.121

0.546

Senate Reelection

-0.183
---------------

Speech Length

-

0.005

0.101

0.004
------- - - - - - - - - - -

Year

-1.527

Carter

0.228

0.101
--

-0.085
27.298
-------

- - - - - - - -----

---

-----

--

0.680
0.338
- - - - - ----

-

----

Reagan

19.518

0.575

George H.W.
Bush

16.648

0.608

Clinton

2.115

0.906
--- - - - - - - - - - - -

GeorgeH.W.
Bush
(a) - No output due to colinearity issues.

-6.313

0.624
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Table 6
Logistic Regression
Dependent Variable Responses that are both Partisan and Disruptive
Model 1 Sig= 0.000, Pseudo R-Square = 0.030
Model 2 Sig= 0.000, Pseudo R-Square = 0.039
Model 1

Model 2

Exp(B)

Exp(B)

Sig.

Speech Length
--

-------

--

0.153

0.980
-

---

------- - - - - - - - - - -

-----

Sig.

-

-

0.994

0.230

----------------------------

Year

0.986

0.859

1.031

0.799

Divided
Government

0.449

0.025*

0.728

0.557

Partisanship

1,781.910

0.206

1.029

0.997

Presidential
Approval

0.975

0.004*

0.968

0.001 *

Presidential
Election

1.149

0.468

1.012

0.956

Midterm Election

1.182

0.425

0.959

0.859

0.985

0.475

1.055

0.188

House Reelection
------

Senate Reelection

-----

-----------

1.006

---

0.578

---------------

Cold War

8.478

0.298

1.016
-----------

-- --------------

----------

---

0.003*

0.978

0.992

0.007*

0.452

0.335

3.020

0.285

1.293

0.585

GeorgeH.W.
Bush

(a)

(a)

Clinton

0.738

0.789

0.339

.I . ___ _g.1~7

- - --------- -------

War on Terror

--

---

---

0.188

Carter
Reagan
-----

George W Bush
- - -- - -

----------

-----

(a) - No output due to colinearity issues.

----------------

---------
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Table 7
Percent of responses per year addressing each issue. Years chosen to represent each
President. An issue must be the primary focus of the President's talking point to be
coded.
r - I
1930
1985
1995
2001
1990
Foreign 16.2%
6.7%
0.0%
5.6%

2009

t---47-.8-% -

1.4%

Affairs
Economic
Growth

0.0%

19.4%

2.7%

8.7%

0.0%

0.0%

5.7%
--

I

Energy

r~~J~-0~-=
I Health Care l 0.0%
-

----

--

5.6%
-------------------

0.0%

--

----

-----

-----------

0.0%

6.3%

2.8%

2.1%

2.9%
--

25.0%

---

0.0%

5.4%
---

-----

9.4%

5.7%

--

-----

---

7.3%

1.4%
-

--------

6.9%

-----

Table 8
Percentage of responses to each issue that were disruptive.
Foreign Affairs

18.7%

Economic Growth

33.2%

Energy

22.2%

Crime

37.3%

Health Care
-

---

-----

24.6%

----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-------

~-

--------------------

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------ - - - - - - -

Table 9
Percentage of responses to each issue that were partisan.
11.9%

Foreign Affairs
-- -

-

----

-

--

------------

Economic Growth

19.8%

Energy

22.2%

Crime

22.9%

Health Care

30.0%
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Appendix B: Coding Chart
Data Set 1 Unit of Measurement - Single Congressional response
Data Set 2 Unit of Measurement - One State of the Union address

-- - - ---- ------ ---- -------- - - - -1

Variable

Data Set 1

Data Set 2

Partisan Response

0- no, l - Yes

% of speech marked 1 in previous
data set, 0-100

Disruptive Response

0 - no, 1 - Yes

% of speech marked l in previous
data set, 0-100

Disruptive and Partisan Response

0- no, 1 - Yes

% of speech marked 1 in previous
data set. 0-100

Issue

Descriptive

Descriptive

Speech Length

Number of seconds from start to end
of speech, range 1781 to 5343

Number of seconds from start to end
of speech, range 1781 to 5343

Carter

0-no, l - Yes

0- no, I - Yes

Reagan

0- no, 1 - Yes

0- no, l - Yes

George H.W. Bush

0 - no, l - Yes

0- no, I - Yes

Clinton

0- no, 1 - Yes

0 - no, l - Yes

George W. Bush

0 - no, I - Yes

0- no, 1 - Yes

Obama

0-no, I - Yes

0- no, I - Yes

Cold War

0- no, l - Yes

0 - no, l - Yes

War on Terror

0- no, 1 - Yes

0- no, 1 - Yes

Year

First year studied is 1 and increases
by 1 each year

First year studied is 1 and increases
by l each year

-

Presidential Election Year

--

-

---------

---!--- _______9__.__ri_o_,_~-Yes _

0 - no, I - Yes

Midterm Election Year

0- no, 1 - Yes

0 - no, l - Yes

Divided Government

0 - no, 1 - Yes

0 - no, I - Yes

Partisanship

Difference between party mean DW- Difference between party mean DWNOMINATE scores, range from
NOMINATE scores, range from
0.514 to 1.091
0.514 to 1.091

House Reelection Rate

Percent of House members reelected, Percent of House members reelected,
~JOO

Senate Reelection Rate

~100

Percent of Senate members reelected, Percent of Senate members reelected,
~100

~100

Presidential Approval

0-100

0-100

Responses

NIA

Number ofresponses during the
speech for that year,

Responses per time

NIA

Responses divided by Speech
Length, range 0.0054 to 0.0325
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